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How do we assess the risk of personal
liability for directors arising out of tortious
acts?
Mark Byrne*
This is well-recognised as a confusing area of the law. This question is still
unsettled today even though the first test which attempted to resolve the
matter was introduced in 1924. Further tests have developed and a great
deal of scrutiny has been given to them all as alternatives to a solution. This
article attempts to summarise the origins of the law and then follow its
progress in order to propose a way forward that may provide the certainty
and predictability that directors must crave to properly assess their personal
risk. It will be argued that all tests should not have to stand alone but
contribute to a scale of analysis that will find a director either a primary or
joint tortfeasor.
I Introduction
It is trite law to say that a director even acting under cover of a company’s
responsibility can attract personal liability for the commission of a tort if he
or she becomes an actor in the conduct of that tort by invading the rights of
another (for example, trespassing on another’s land or seizing their goods).1
Similarly it is also true that a company, as a separate entity, can be liable in
tort for its own actions (naturally carried out singularly or collectively by its
physical agents). Some examples would include breaches of contracts
generally (the tort of inducing a breach of contract, interfering in contractual
relations or conspiracy to breach a contract), breaches of intellectual property
rights (the tort of passing off) and actions for misleading and deceptive
conduct (the tort of negligent misrepresentation).
The real risk however in terms of personal lability for directors in tortious
actions, is being joined with the company as a joint tortfeasor. The
signiﬁcance of this article is that this type of potential personal liability would
not be expected to be high on the list of concerns for directors. This could be
expected when their focus is primarily on satisfying the many statutory duties
and obligations they have, whether it be under the Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) or the myriad of other pieces of legislation requiring compliance. But as
this article will show, the risk is deﬁnitely real, particularly when it comes to
closely held companies, and has been the subject of many signiﬁcant cases.
Directors generally think in terms of their duties and obligations to the
company and to the shareholders as a whole, whereas this risk is another
example of an exception where liability could come directly and personally to
the directors from external parties under the right circumstances.
One of the reasons directors may be more blase´ about this risk is that it is
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1 Knights Capital Group Ltd v Bajada and Associates Pty Ltd [2016] WASC 69 (4 March
2016) [68] (‘Knights Capital’).
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easy to get caught up in the express statutory regimes. This article should
serve as a timely reminder that the Corporations Act, dealing with the personal
liability of directors, for example, has ‘effect in addition to, and not in
derogation of, any rule of law relating to the duty or liability of a person
because of their office or employment in relation to a corporation; and ...
[does] not prevent the commencement of civil proceedings for a breach of a
duty ...’.2 So it is yet another example where third parties may include
directors in a personal action and overcome the directors’ ability to hide
behind the corporate veil.
Even when directors consider this potential liability as a joint tortfeasor
with their company, their concerns may be low because of the long standing
principle that has become known as the rule in Said v Butt.3
The application of that principle has been held to have the consequence that where
a director of a company, acting within the scope of his or her authority, causes the
company to breach a contract with a third party, the director cannot be held liable for
inducing or procuring the company to breach the contract.4
It seems that directors may have taken comfort from this approach even in a
broader context than just inducing or procuring a breach of contract. That is,
provided the director is acting within the scope of their authority the corporate
veil will protect them.
However in reality there have been many cases that have demonstrated a
preparedness of the courts to lift that corporate veil and ﬁnd the director
personally liable. The difficulty is that the law to determine this is unsettled
and still being debated. Numerous tests and criteria have been put forward, but
the elements that should make up a certain set of principles to be applied have
not been resolved.
there may be room for further judicial exploration of the basis for, and limits of, the
rule in Said v Butt, and the place of that rule within the common law’s approach to
the tort liability of directors more generally. Furthermore, the test for determining
when a director is involved in the company’s tortious conduct beyond merely being
a director of the company, so that the director may be found liable as a joint
tortfeasor with a company, for torts committed by that company, is not settled.5
It is worth noting that the above commentary was made in 2016. It has taken
us more than 90 years to get to this point of analysis. Is it not about time that
we can provide the principles and the underlying elements that we can rely
upon with certainty and predictability?
The main goals therefore of this article are to:
(1) Highlight the potential risk of liability for directors who may not
currently or adequately perceive it;
2 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 185. See also s 179.
3 [1920] 3 KB 497. It is worth noting that the principle comes from the judgment of
McCardie J. He hypothetically considered the position of directors’ liability as joint
tortfeasors even though there was no breach of contract by the relevant company. Despite the
arguments therefore, that the comments are obiter, its weight has broadly been accepted as
the ‘rule’ so described.
4 Knights Capital [2016] WASC 69 (4 March 2016) [57].
5 Ibid [81].
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(2) Identify the key elements of that liability as far as we can distil them
to date; and
(3) Suggest a way forward that will provide a level of certainty that all
directors must crave in making their own personal risk assessments.
II A summary of the tests developed to ﬁnd a director
personally liable as a primary or joint tortfeasor
This summary of the tests includes approaches across a number of
jurisdictions including the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and
Australia. The 1920s saw the genesis of these tests and by the time we reached
the next century there had arguably been at least four distinct approaches that
can be identiﬁed but it has been hard to ﬁnd consistency. We still have the
confusing situation in Australia where State Supreme Courts and Federal
Courts have been emphasising various criteria but have not been deﬁnitive.
This is often because no matter which test is applied, liability would ﬂow or
because of the slightly different language being used in the earlier cases relied
upon. On closer inspection, at the end of this article, it will be argued there is
good reason to rationalise elements and provide a great deal more certainty. It
is worth noting on this point that most of the key cases in this area have been
dealt with in the Federal Court of Australia or State Supreme Courts and
without necessarily binding authority.
Judges6 and commentators7 have long suggested that the uncertainty in this
area is a consequence of a clash between the principles of company law and
the law of torts. For some, it is even a question of which should dominate.8 A
cornerstone of company law is the existence of the corporation as a separate
legal entity distinct from its human controllers. There is an apparent conﬂict
in allowing directors, when carrying out their functions as directors, to be held
personally liable for the tortious acts of this separate corporate being.
Unfortunately the existing theoretical models that support the company have
been unable to ﬁnd a way through the complex policy considerations. It has
been argued that, ‘neither theory nor commonly accepted corporate law
doctrines are of particular use in the resolution of disputes between directors
and the tort creditors of their companies’.9 While company law theory
struggles to ﬁnd an appropriate solution, tort law is simply trying to hold the
wrongdoer responsible for the harm caused.10
The development of these tests has been the subject of many academic
6 Mentmore Manufacturing Co Ltd v National Merchandising Manufacturing Co Inc (1978)
89 DLR (3d) 195, 202.
7 John H Farrar, ‘The Personal Liability of Directors for Corporate Torts’ (1997) 9 Bond Law
Review 102, 112.
8 Ross Grantham and Charles Rickett, ‘Directors’ “tortious” liability: Contract, tort or
company law?’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 133, 139.
9 Helen Anderson, ‘The theory of the corporation and its relevance to directors’ tortious
liability to creditors’ (2004) 16 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 73; Ross Grantham
and Charles Rickett, ‘Company directors’ liability for torts’ [2003] New Zealand Law
Journal 155.
10 The principle that everyone should be answerable for his or her tortious wrongs (alterum non
laedere): John H Farrar, ‘Personal Liability of Directors for Torts of Company’ (1997) 71
Australian Law Journal 20.
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articles that have critiqued and analysed the approaches.11 Although they may
have been described in slightly different ways there are arguably four distinct
categories of test that can be identiﬁed. They are:
(1) The ‘direct or procure test’ (or the ‘Performing Right Society’12 test);
(2) The ‘make the tort his own test’ (or the ‘Mentmore’13 test);
(3) The ‘assumption of responsibility test’ (or the ‘Trevor Ivory’14 test);
and
(4) The ‘Root Quality’15 test including the general notion of directors
procuring the company to violate a legal right.
A The direct or procure test
The approach which has been called ‘the direct or procure test’ has its origins
in the case of Rainham Chemical Works Ltd (in liq) v Belvedere Fish Guano
Co Ltd.16 The House of Lords in this appeal was trying to determine whether
the directors of a company should be personally liable, along with the
company, on the basis of an action on the principle of Rylands v Fletcher.17
In an often quoted part of his judgment, Lord Buckmaster considered the
general question of the personal liability of directors of the tortious acts of the
company as follows:
If the company was really trading independently on its own account, the fact that it
was directed by Messrs Feldman and Partridge would not render them responsible
for its tortious acts unless, indeed, they were acts expressly directed by them. If a
company is formed for the express purpose of doing a wrongful act or if, when
formed, those in control expressly directed a wrongful thing be done, individuals as
well as the company are responsible for the consequences, but there is no evidence
in the present case to establish liability under either of these heads.18
Lord Atkin relied upon this judgment in Performing Right Society Ltd v Ciryl
Theatrical Syndicate Ltd19 as supporting the following statement of principle:
‘Prima facie a managing director is not liable for tortious acts done by servants
11 David A Wishart, ‘The personal liability of directors in tort’ (1992) 10 Company and
Securities Law Journal 363; G H L Fridman, ‘Personal tort liability of company directors’
(1992) 5 Canterbury Law Review 41; Mary-Anne Simpson, ‘Directors’ liability in tort’
(1995) New Zealand Law Journal 6; ibid; Farrar, ‘The Personal Liability of Directors for
Corporate Torts’, above n 7; Grantham and Rickett, ‘Directors’ “Tortious” Liability, above
n 8; Grantham and Charles Rickett, ‘Company directors’ liability for torts’, above n 9;
Stephen Todd, ‘Assuming responsibility for torts’ (2003) 119 Law Quarterly Review 199;
Anderson, above n 9; Peter Watts, ‘Trevor Ivory v Anderson; reasoning from outer space’
[2007] New Zealand Law Journal 25; Susan Watson, ‘Liability of individuals for torts of the
company’ (2007) New Zealand Law Journal 27; Neil Foster, ‘Personal civil liability of
company officers for company workplace torts’ (2008) 16 Torts Law Journal 20.
12 Performing Right Society Ltd v Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate Ltd [1924] 1 KB 1 (‘Performing
Right Society’).
13 Mentmore Manufacturing Co Ltd v National Merchandising Manufacturing Co Inc (1978)
89 DLR (3d) 195.
14 Trevor Ivory Ltd v Anderson [1992] 2 NZLR 517 (‘Trevor Ivory’).
15 Root Quality Pty Ltd v Root Control Technologies Pty Ltd (2000) 177 ALR 231 (‘Root
Quality’).
16 [1921] 2 AC 465 (‘Rainham Chemical’).
17 [1861–73] All ER Rep 1.
18 Rainham Chemical [1921] 2 AC 465, 476.
19 [1924] 1 KB 1.
354 (2017) 32 Australian Journal of Corporate Law
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 81 SESS: 6 OUTPUT: Wed Nov 22 14:56:54 2017
/journals/journal/ajcl/vol32pt3/part_3
of the company unless he himself is privy to the acts, that is to say unless he
ordered or procured the acts to be done.’20
He thought however this was more narrowly put than would be needed as
a general pronouncement of the law. He was of the view that the express
direction from the directors is not necessary for their personal liability. ‘If the
directors themselves directed or procured the commission of the act they
would be liable in whatever sense they did so, whether expressly or
impliedly.’21
The approach in these cases received further approval in the Privy Council
in Wah Tat Bank Ltd v Chan Cheng Kum.22 The Court of Appeal too in
C Evans & Sons Ltd v Spritebrand Ltd23 endorsed this test but with the view
that it could not ‘be regarded as a precise and unqualiﬁed statement of the
principles governing a director’s personal liability for his company’s torts’.24
This was not intended as a criticism of the previous judgments as Slade LJ felt
the description of principle in the test was not intended to be so precise and
he did not wish to attempt to deﬁne the circumstances in which a director may
have authorised, directed or procured a tortious act of the company.25
B The ‘make the tort his own’ test
The ‘make the tort his own’ test, originated in the Canadian decision of
Mentmore Manufacturing Co Inc v National Merchandising Manufacturing
Co Inc.26 The Federal Court of Appeal, as in so many cases in this area, was
considering the potential personal liability of a director arising out of the
infringement by the company of intellectual property rights. The court was
presented with the authorities of Rainham Chemical27 and Performing Right
Society28 which were relied upon by the trial judge as representing the
applicable law. Le Dain J was concerned that the ‘direct or procure test’ could
too easily mean that a director of the company could be personally liable
where their conduct was only such that would be normally required in the
management of the relevant corporation. He was very conscious of the
competing issues of policy but thought something more than mere direction
should be required to look behind the corporate structure and this should apply
not only to large corporations but also the smaller closely held ones as well.
What is involved here is a very difficult question of policy. On the one hand, there
is the principle that an incorporated company is separate and distinct in law from its
shareholders, directors and officers, and it is in the interests of the commercial
purposes served by incorporated enterprise that they should as a general rule enjoy
the beneﬁt of a limited liability afforded by incorporation. On the other hand, there
is the principle that everyone should answer for his tortious acts ... It would render
the offices of director or principal officer unduly hazardous if the degree of direction
20 Ibid 14.
21 Performing Right Society [1924] 1 KB 1, 15.
22 [1975] AC 507 (‘Wah Tat Bank’).
23 [1985] 2 All ER 415 (‘C Evans’).
24 Ibid 424.
25 Ibid.
26 (1978) 89 DLR (3d) 195.
27 Rainham Chemical Works Ltd (in liq) v Belvedere Fish Guano Co Ltd [1921] 2 AC 465.
28 Performing Right Society Ltd v Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate Ltd [1924] 1 KB 1.
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normally required in the management of the corporations manufacturing and selling
activity could by itself make the director or officer personally liable for infringement
by his company.29
So what should this further requirement be? Le Dain J relied upon a number
of English decisions30 as support for the proposition that personal liability was
seen as only being warranted where the directors were knowing, deliberate or
wilful participants in the tort. Liability, to his mind then, required this extra
quality in order to ‘make the tortious act his own’.
What ... is the kind of participation in the acts of the company that should give rise
to personal liability? It is an elusive question. It would appear to be that degree and
kind of personal involvement by which the director or officer makes the tortious act
his own. It is obviously a question of fact to be decided on the circumstances of each
case. I have not found much assistance in the particular cases in which courts have
concluded that the facts were such as to warrant personal liability. But there would
appear to have been in these cases a knowing, deliberate, wilful quality to the
participation.31
This is of course a higher test than one requiring evidence of direction or
procurement but this is defended on the grounds that to require less would
open the ﬂoodgates of potential liability particularly to directors of small
companies.
This stricter test was rejected by the Court of Appeal in C Evans.32
Signiﬁcantly the Court of Appeal did not try to reﬁne the broad nature of the
direct or procure test but seemed content to let each case be resolved on its
own particular acts.
Although the Mentmore test has been criticised and speciﬁcally rejected by
Australian courts,33 there has also been some support for the approach. In a
number of cases over this period it has been demonstrated that the courts in
Australia have been reluctant to resolve the issue of the competing tests.
Commonly this has been because on the facts of the relevant case any
distinction has not been necessary. Directors have commonly been found to be
knowing, deliberate or wilful participants in the tort. It has even been
suggested that any difference between the tests is more apparent than real.34
29 Mentmore (1978) 89 DLR (3d) 195, 202.
30 Reitzman v Grahame-Chapman and Derustit Ltd (1950) 67 RPC 178; Oertli AG v EJ
Bowman (London) Ltd [1956] RPC 282; Yuille v B & B Fisheries (Leigh) Ltd and Bates
[1958] 2 Lloyds Rep 596; Wah Tat Bank [1975] AC 507.
31 Mentmore (1978) 89 DLR (3d) 195, 203.This approach was endorsed by Nourse J in the
High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) decision of White Horse Distillers Ltd v Gregson
Associates Ltd [1984] RPC 61,91–2.
32 C Evans & Sons Ltd v Spritebrand Ltd [1985] 2 All ER 415.
33 Eg, Johnson Matthey (Aust) Ltd v Dascorp Pty Ltd (2003) 9 VR 171; Foxtel Management
Pty Ltd v Mod Shop Pty Ltd (2007) 165 FCR 149; Huhtamaki Australia Ltd v Australia Pak
Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 62 (10 February 2006).
34 As discussed later in the article: Allen Manufacturing Co Pty Ltd v McCallum & Co Pty Ltd
(2001) 53 IPR 400, 410 [43] (‘Allen Manufacturing’).
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C The assumption of responsibility test
This test originated in the NZ Court of Appeal in the decision of Trevor Ivory
Ltd v Anderson.35 At ﬁrst instance, Heron J had found Mr Ivory, the director
of Trevor Ivory Ltd, personally liable in tort for the breach of a duty of care
to clients of the company. Mr Ivory had supplied negligent advice and
instructions. Mr Ivory arguably had provided this advice through a contract
that existed between his company and the client. Damages were awarded
against the company on the basis of both contract and tort. Most signiﬁcantly
however the judge found Mr Ivory to have had a personal duty of care to the
clients in giving his advice and that he should be personally liable, along with
the company, for his negligence in breaching that duty.
All three appeal judges, Cooke P, Hardie Boys and McGechan JJ supported
the trial judge’s decision in relation to the liability of the company but rejected
the ﬁnding that Mr Ivory in these circumstances should have a personal
liability in tort. Although they all recognised that such a liability was possible
they were each concerned to ﬁnd in the conduct of the director some evidence
that he had assumed a personal responsibility. Hardie Boys and McGechan JJ
believed Mr Ivory’s conduct had brought him close to that position but in the
end the court unanimously found no liability for him.
The clearest expression of what has come to be known as the ‘assumption
of responsibility’ test is contained in the judgment of Hardie Boys J. The judge
carefully drew a distinction between the situation where directors will be
personally liable for their own tortious acts and the position where the
director’s acts are actually the acts of the company in a legal sense. In a
passage which included a discussion of Lee v Lee’s Air Farming Ltd,36 Tesco
Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass37and Sealand of the Paciﬁc v Robert C McHaffıe
Ltd38 the judge stressed the signiﬁcance of these different capacities. He
thought it would be the usual case that the director’s conduct would be seen
as the acts of the company as the separate entity rather than the acts of the
director as agent. In these circumstances, personal liability could only arise
where there was evidence that the director had done something more than
merely act for the company, so as to assume that personal liability.
In the policy area, I ﬁnd no difficulty in the imposition of personal liability on a
director in appropriate circumstances. To make a director liable for his personal
negligence does not in my opinion run counter to the purposes and effect of
incorporation. Those purposes relevantly include protection of shareholders from the
company’s liabilities, but that affords no reason to protect directors from the
consequences of their own acts and omissions. What does run counter to the
purposes and effect of incorporation is a failure to recognise the two capacities in
which directors may act; that in appropriate circumstances they are to be identiﬁed
with the company itself, so that their acts are in truth the company’s acts. Indeed I
consider that the nature of corporate personality requires that this identiﬁcation
normally be the basic premise and that clear evidence be needed to displace it with
35 [1992] 2 NZLR 517.
36 [1961] NZLR 325.
37 [1972] AC 153.
38 (1974) 51 DLR (3d) 702 (‘Sealand of the Paciﬁc’).
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a ﬁnding that a director is acting not as the company but as the company’s agent or
servant in a way that renders him personally liable ...
Essentially, I think the test is, or at least includes, whether there has been an
assumption of responsibility, actual or imputed. That is an appropriate test for the
personal liability of both a director and an employee.39
There is the clear indication in this passage that the personal liability of the
director arises under this test, not as a joint tortfeasor with the company, but
because their conduct was such that they could be said to have personally
assumed responsibility as an agent for the company. In other words, if the
director gets so personally involved in the relevant act they will lose the
protection of the company structure because they will be seen as becoming an
agent of the company and not simply part of the company performing its own
act. So for Hardie Boys J, the assumption of responsibility test on this basis
is about properly identifying when the acts of the director become their own
acts rather than simply carrying out their functions within the company
structure.
For Cooke P it seemed the whole question turned on whether the relevant
director in the course of activities on behalf of the company came under a
personal duty to a third party.40 In Centrepac Partnership v Foreign Currency
Consultants Ltd41 Gault J in the High Court of New Zealand did not follow
this test because it was found that the advice given by the relevant employee
was the result of a clear personal engagement42 to provide the service.
However the principles described by Gault J are directly on point.
To ﬁnd a duty of care in this situation, in my view, does not involve lifting the
corporate veil. The duty of care exists directly between the plaintiffs and
Mr Rutherfurd. That applies notwithstanding the separate obligations existing in
contract between Mr Rutherfurd’s company and client. It will not be in all cases in
which a duty of care will be found to exist between a company director and the
clients of the company. Each situation will depend upon its own facts as in any case
of negligence, and it is only where there is a sufficient degree of proximity and harm
is foreseeable that the individual director personally will be held to owe a duty of
care. These separate liability of a director or other employee of a company that torts
committed by him is not excluded simply because the company also is vicariously
liable. Similarly the fact that the company may be liable in contract is no reason to
exclude liability upon directors or employees for tortious acts.43
Cooke P was of the view that while Mr Ivory’s personal advice was very
important to the client he was identifying himself with the company and
providing that advice through the company in such a manner which could not
give rise to a separate personal duty of care.44
In the ﬁnal judgment, McGechan J is also clearly of the opinion, after his
analysis of Fairline Shipping Corporation v Adamson45 that the touchstone for
liability is whether or not there has been an ‘assumption of responsibility’ by
39 Trevor Ivory [1992] 2 NZLR 517, 527.
40 Relying upon Sealand of the Paciﬁc (1974) 51 DLR (3d) 702.
41 Centrepac Partnership v Foreign Currency Consultants Ltd (1989) 4 NZCLC 64,940.
42 Ibid 64,951.
43 Ibid.
44 Trevor Ivory [1992] 2 NZLR 517, 524.
45 [1975] QB 180 (‘Fairline Shipping’).
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the director even if given in the course of the company’s operations.46
The ‘assumption of responsibility’ test received endorsement in the House
of Lords decision of Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd.47 Lord Steyn
delivered a judgment which was supported by all four of the other Lords. His
Lordship conﬁrmed that the assumption of responsibility test is simply the
application of the principles enunciated in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller.48
It seemed clear that for Lord Steyn a personal liability for a director of the
company could only be found where it could be demonstrated that there was
a special relationship between that director and the other party. The nature of
the relationship that the plaintiff may have had with the company does not
bear on this issue. It is how the director himself or herself has personally
engaged with the plaintiff which must be considered to determine if they have
so assumed responsibility in circumstances as to make them a primary
tortfeasor.49
The conclusion that must be drawn here from the Trevor Ivory case and the
Williams case is that the focus of these courts has been upon ﬁnding personal
liability for the director as a primary tortfeasor. In other words, it is a question
of ﬁnding that the director has acted in such a way as it can be said that he or
she has stepped out from behind the company and should be liable for their
own acts because they have personally satisﬁed the requirements of the tort.
It does not matter then that a company has been involved contractually
because the director has brought the liability upon themselves by their own
direct relationship with the plaintiff. The company in the Williams case was
already held to be liable for the negligent advice under Hedley Byrne.
Although the matter was not pleaded in the case, Lord Steyn considered this
possibility of the director being a joint tortfeasor and found the argument
unsustainable.50
The House of Lords reviewed this decision again in Standard Chartered
Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corporation [Nos 2 and 4].51
Lord Hoffmann, who had concurred with Lord Steyn in the William’s case,
delivered the lead judgment. He conﬁrmed the principles discussed above as
having application to the tort of negligent misrepresentation. However, when
the Court of Appeal in this decision had tried to apply the same principles to
the tort of deceit, Lord Hoffmann conﬁrmed how inappropriate this was.52 The
director in this case was not being sued for the company’s tort. It was simply
a question of his own liability for fraud and the court should consider whether
the elements of the tort could be proved against him. The assumption of
responsibility test therefore was never meant to have general application to all
torts. Its application, given its origins in Hedley Byrne, is to the potential
liability for the giving of negligent advice or services. Its use is to determine
whether it is appropriate to ﬁnd a duty of care directly between a director (as
46 Trevor Ivory [1992] 2 NZLR 517, 529.
47 Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1998] 2 All ER 577 (‘Williams’).
48 [1964] AC 465 (‘Hedley Byrne’).
49 Williams [1998] 2 All ER 577, 582, 584. Note however that it is seen as a question of ﬁnding
the director liable as a primary tortfeasor rather than as a joint tortfeasor with the company.
50 Ibid 585.
51 [2003] 1 All ER 173.
52 Ibid 180.
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a potential primary tortfeasor) and the party who has dealt with the company.
In Australia, McPherson JA in the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of
Queensland in Interchase Corp Ltd v ACN 010087573 Pty Ltd53 expressed
‘serious misgivings’ about the Williams case as well as others that followed
it.54 This case involved an action in negligence in respect of a valuation of real
estate. The valuer who had carried out the valuation as an employee of Hillier
Parker (Queensland) Pty Ltd was found not liable personally at trial. This is
because the Court had followed the Williams case and had found that the
valuer had not assumed personal responsibility for the valuation which,
although signed by him, was provided in the name of the company.
McPherson JA was very critical of this analysis.
Hillier Parker was held liable to Interchase in tort because Mr Waghorn was
personally negligent in carrying out his valuation of the Myer Centre, for which
Hillier Parker as his employer or principal was in law vicariously responsible to
Interchase. Vicarious liability proceeds on the footing that the individual wrongdoer
and the person who is vicariously liable are joint tortfeasors. To say that the principal
or employer is legally responsible but that the actual wrongdoer is not, seems to me
to be an inversion of the whole doctrine.55
The whole question of how the tortious liability of directors or employees is
categorised or framed is obviously so crucial when considering how the legal
principles apply and how one case can be reconciled with another. In
Interchase the Court of Appeal was clearly of the view that the employee in
that instance was a primary tortfeasor as the person who provided the
third-party plaintiff with the negligent valuation. His employer, was then also
liable in tort, vicariously. In the words of McPherson JA, this means the
employee and the employer company are joint tortfeasors. In Williams the
court started with a different proposition. They started by accepting that the
company in that case was already liable in negligence given its duty to the
plaintiff. The question was whether the director also owed a personal duty to
the plaintiff, a breach of which would mean he could be personally liable. For
the House of Lords it was not a question of joint tortfeasance.
Arguably the fundamental difference in these cases is how the acts of the
individual are perceived. In Interchase, the valuation by the employee is
clearly seen as the personal professional act by that individual as agent for the
employer company. The negligence by the employee is then seen as the
primary tort liability and the liability of the employer company is vicarious. In
Williams, the advice provided to the plaintiff through the acts of the director
was seen as, the advice of and the act of, the company. Therefore the company
had the primary liability in tort and the only question was whether or not the
director should themselves also be liable, not as a joint tortfeasor, but because
they themselves separately owed a personal duty of care. Trevor Ivory, like
Williams, has as its foundation that the acts of the director were indeed the acts
of the company. Again, on this basis the primary tortfeasor in negligence is the
53 Interchase Corporation Ltd (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Queensland) Pty Ltd [No 3] [2003] 1
Qd R 26 (‘Interchase’).
54 Ibid 59 [77]. McMurdo P in this decision also indicated she was not persuaded that Williams
[1998] 2 All ER 577 correctly states the law in Queensland: at 32 [9].
55 Ibid 59 [77].
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company. Perhaps the real criticism of Williams and Trevor Ivory should lie,
not in a discussion about the competing interests of tort law and company law,
but in the way in which the acts of the players are interpreted. If in these cases,
the directors were seen as engaging in their own acts as agents for the
company the result would have been quite different. The principles of tort law,
as applied by McPherson JA to the employee in Interchase, would dictate that
the director must be the primary tortfeasor and the company’s liability is
vicarious. The real question therefore must be the interpretation of the law that
determines when a director’s acts as agent can be seen as the acts of the
company.
On the basis of this analysis, it is interesting to review the English decision
following Williams in MCA Records Inc v Charly Records Ltd56 and the
subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) in MCA Records Inc
v Charly Records Ltd.57 In the case of the former, Rimer J, attempted to
summarise when directors or employees could be liable for tortious acts. He
found there were three circumstances. First, when the director or employee
commits the tort themselves. Second, when the director or employee assumes
a personal liability (consistent with the authorities of Fairline Shipping;
Trevor Ivory and Williams). Third, when he or she procures and induces the
company to commit the tort.58 In his review of Williams he did not interpret
Lord Steyn’s discussion regarding joint tortfeasance by the company and the
director as preventing the third type of liability.59
In the Court of Appeal, Chadwick LJ, in the lead judgment, was supportive
of Rimer J. Like Rimer J he thought it was impossible to read Lord Steyn’s
judgment in the Williams case as meaning that a director could never be liable
as a joint tortfeasor with the company. He described four propositions as being
supported by the authorities. The most signiﬁcant however is the last.
[W]hether or not there is a separate tort procuring an infringement of the statutory
right, actionable at common law, an individual who does ‘intend, procure and share
a common design’ that the infringement should take place may be liable as a joint
tortfeasor.60
As will be discussed at the conclusion of this article, it appears the original
purpose of this test in ﬁnding whether a director is the primary tortfeasor, has
in many respects confused the development of the law in this area.
D The Root Quality test
The decision of Root Quality Pty Ltd v Root Control Technologies Pty Ltd61
came at a time when all of the earlier tests had been debated and considered
for some years. Finkelstein J described the position at the time as follows:
Much has been written about the liability of directors and other officers for corporate
wrongdoing. The cases present a confusing picture on an issue that has persistently
56 [2000] EMLR 743.
57 [2003] 1 BCLC 93.
58 MCA Records Inc v Charly Records Ltd [2000] EMLR 743, 751 [17].
59 Ibid 754 [21], 756 [24].
60 MCA Records Inc v Charly Records Ltd [2003] 1 BCLC 93, 117 [52].
61 (2000) 177 ALR 231.
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vexed the common law. In recent years the uncertainty has increased partly by
reason of divergent decisions and partly for other reasons.62
This description is probably as apt today as it was then. Finkelstein J was of
the opinion that to be a joint tortfeasor with a company the director must
procure the corporation to violate the legal rights of another and considers this
a separate tort based on the case of Lumley v Gye63.64 He considered the
authority of Said v Butt65 and if applied this meant ‘a director or officer acting
in that capacity could not be found liable for procuring his corporation to
infringe the rights of another’.66 He conﬁrmed that Said v Butt67 did indeed
represent the law of Australia. The reason the director might escape liability,
if only acting in that capacity, is that in those circumstances the acts of the
director are actually the acts of the company.
So ultimately the question for Finkelstein J was when the director should
lose his or her protection behind the company.68 At what point would their
conduct mean that they have themselves committed the tort of procuring the
company to infringe the rights of another? As mentioned earlier, to answer this
question he does seem to rely upon the Mentmore line of cases.
Finkelstein J seems to be supporting the added mental element from the
Mentmore test that for a director to be liable personally he or she needs to have
at least acted with reckless indifference as to the unlawfulness and harm that
might be caused.69
III Distilling and rationalising these varying tests into
one set of key criteria
At the time of writing this article it has been 17 years since the last of the
above tests arose (‘the Root Quality Test’). The Federal Courts however and
at least one Supreme Court has had the opportunity to revisit the various tests
and their elements and some signiﬁcant headway has been made. However, as
pointed out in the introduction to this article70 the law is still unsettled. Even
as late as 2015, although there had been considerable analysis of the issues,
the Federal Court, at least on the face of it, was considering the application of
the last three of the above tests (to the exclusion of the ‘direct or procure
test’).71
Despite this continuing uncertainty the tests have been distilling and
62 Ibid 258 [115].
63 (1853) 118 ER 749.
64 Root Quality (2000) 177 ALR 231, 258 [118].
65 [1920] 3 KB 497.
66 (2000) 177 ALR 231, 262 [130].
67 [1920] 3 KB 497.
68 He considered in some detail the decision of Trevor Ivory [1992] 2 NZLR 517 but conﬁrmed
in reliance on Banﬁeld v Johnson (1994) 7 NZCLC 260,496 that it should not be regarded
as authority for the proposition that it will only be in the case of ‘an assumption of liability’
that a director or officer will be found liable for a personal tort: Root Quality (2000) 177
ALR 231, 265–6.
69 This was certainly the interpretation given to Finkelstein J’s judgment in Allen
Manufacturing (2001) 53 IPR 400, 410 [40].
70 See discussion above in Knights Capital [2016] WASC 69 (4 March 2016) [57].
71 Facton Ltd v XU (2015) 111 IPR 103.
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concentrating to reveal the key criteria. The ﬁrst signiﬁcant case to do so was
Keller v LED Technologies Pty Ltd.72 This case provided a review of the tests
and the ﬁrst signiﬁcant issue was the view that to be a joint tortfeasor there
must be some mental element involved. Merely directing or procuring the
company to act in his or her capacity as a director will not be enough. He or
she must be doing something more which includes him or her in addition to
the company as an invader of the victim’s rights.73 An example of this is where
the director is using the company as an instrument for the infringement. That
is, attempting to hide behind the corporate veil.74 There was an endorsement
also by Jessup J of the ‘Mentmore test’ with regard to the degree of knowledge
required of the director before liability could ensue. ‘A close personal
involvement in the infringing acts by the director must be shown before he or
she will be held liable. The director’s knowledge will be relevant.’75 In
conclusion, Jessup J thought the director’s liability required ‘a dimension to
his or her role which was separate from the good faith discharge of his or her
duties in the service of the company. If so, there will be a basis, in accordance
with general principles, for making the individual liable because he or she was
involved in a joint, wrongful, enterprise with the company.’76
So at least two key issues within the original tests were questioned and the
development of this was taken up in Sporte Leisure Pty Ltd v Paul’s
International Pty Ltd [No 3].77 In reliance on Keller.78 Nicholas J in the
Federal Court conﬁrmed the growing opinion that the ‘direct or procure test’
could not be applied literally.79 In fact, if it had in that case, the relevant
director would have been found liable but in the end he was not. He conﬁrmed
the necessity of the mental element of the director as in ‘Mentmore’ which he
could not ﬁnd in this case. But what level of personal knowledge and
involvement is necessary? Personal involvement, in his opinion, was not a
prerequisite to being a joint tortfeasor. ‘Knowledge of a director that his or her
company is invading another person’s legal rights is something which may in
a particular case be no less signiﬁcant ...’80 However, a director who held an
honest belief that the relevant acts they performed for the company were not
unlawful can be decisive.
It is rational to conclude to this point that directing or procuring acts, of
itself, is not enough and that some extra level of knowledge and involvement
must be present. Taleb v GM Holden Ltd81 continued in this vein. On appeal,
in a joint judgment by Finn and Bennett JJ they referred to the questions asked
in the original action to potentially ﬁnd if the relevant director could be liable
as a joint tortfeasor (the company was already determined to be liable) and
apparently endorsed them. They were:
72 Keller v LED Technologies Pty Ltd (2010) 185 FCR 449 (‘Keller’).
73 Ibid 469 [83]–[84].
74 Ibid 469 [84].
75 Ibid 512–13 [291].
76 Ibid 543 [407].
77 (2010) 275 ALR 258 (‘Sporte Leisure’).
78 Keller v LED Technologies Pty Ltd (2010) 185 FCR 449.
79 Sporte Leisure (2010) 275 ALR 258, 279 [111].
80 Ibid 280–1 [115].
81 (2011) 286 ALR 309.
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(i) Did he have the necessary knowledge of the wrongs being committed by the
company?
(ii) Did he use the company as an instrument of his own wrong?
(iii) Did he make the tort his own?
(iv) Did he have a close personal involvement in the infringing acts of [the
principal company tortfeasor]?82
Arguably all these questions are on a scale that is simply being used to ﬁnd
that extra element necessary on top of ‘directing and procuring’. Presumably
the answer, should it be found in the affirmative to any of them, could give rise
to liability.
In JR Consulting & Drafting Pty Ltd v Cummings83 while endorsing the
‘make the tort his own test’ the key legal principle to determine liability as a
joint tortfeasor was put as follows:
[T]here must be a concurrence in the acts of both the company and the director
causing the damage rather than coincidence of roles comprised of the company as
an entity doing something and a director discharging duties as a director of the
company doing that thing.84
Signiﬁcantly, after reviewing the authorities it was clear that a director;
must be shown to have directed or procured the tort and the conduct must, clearly
enough, go beyond causing the company to take a commercial or business course of
action or directing the company’s decision-making where both steps are the good
faith and reasonable expression of the discharge of the duties and obligations of the
director, as a director. The additional component required is a ‘close personal
involvement’ in the infringing conduct of the company and inevitably the quality or
degree of that closeness will require careful examination on a case by case basis.85
Again, this endorses the need to go beyond merely ‘directing and procuring’
and the language of ‘close personal involvement’ incorporates this.
Similarly in Knights Capital Group Ltd v Bajada and Associates Pty Ltd86
the language is enhanced by the view that a director could not escape personal
liability if they became an ‘actor’ in the invasion of the plaintiff’s rights.87
Again, it is merely a description that still goes to the heart of the issue, which
is the level of knowledge and involvement. It is such a signiﬁcant case
however in the way it traces back this whole question of liability to the rule
in Said v Butt.88 Most importantly it recently conﬁrms for us the following
three things:
(1) That we must accept the possibility of exceptions to Said v Butt;
(2) That the scope of Said v Butt remains largely unexplored; and
82 Ibid 314 [18].
83 (2016) 329 ALR 625.
84 Ibid 686 [335].
85 Ibid 689 [350].
86 [2016] WASC 69 (4 March 2016).
87 Ibid [68].
88 [1920] 3 KB 497.
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(3) That outside of procuring or interfering with contractual relations a
director can be personally liable for a tort committed by the
corporation for such things as procuring a breach of trust, statutory
duty, other wrongs.89
[T]here may be room for further judicial exploration of the basis for, and the limits
of, the rule in Said v Butt and the place of that rule within the common law’s
approach to the tort liability of directors more generally. Furthermore the test for
determining when a director is involved in the company’s tortious conduct ... so that
the director may be found liable as a joint tortfeasor with a company, for torts
committed by that company, is not settled.90
There is one ﬁnal case that deserves review. It puts into perspective the
signiﬁcance of this whole unsettled area of law and the debates above. It
highlights the difference between the ability of an external party or client of
a company being able to join a director with the company in a tortious action
and an action based on the Corporations Act itself. Australian Securities and
Investments Comission v Cassimatis [No 8]91 was essentially an action taken
by Australian Securities and Investments Comission (‘ASIC’) against the two
directors (and only shareholders) of a company for contravention of s 180(1)
of the Corporations Act. That is, a breach of their duties of care and diligence.
The ﬁrst important thing to note is that the action is taken by ASIC rather
than an external client of the company where that third party joins the
directors with the company as joint tortfeasors. This is a very interesting case
in the way in which it considers the question of whether a breach of s 180(1)
which has long been held as a private duty owed to the corporation, could also
have a public character. Its public nature is said to be borne out by:
(1) A public body prosecution which can result in remedies for persons
affected by the conduct (including the external client);
(2) Pecuniary penalties payable to the Commonwealth;
(3) Disqualiﬁcation as a director; and
(4) The inability of the company to ratify the statutory breach.92
Although not being able to resolve the question of the public nature of
s 180(1)93 there was clearly a view that the action could and would afford third
party clients of the company that conducted dubious ﬁnancial business
practices appropriate remedies.
With respect, while all of this is true, the real issue is that such a breach of
duty must be taken by ASIC or the company itself. The plaintiff client of the
company as an external party would not have the locus standi to sue the
directors directly for the breach of duty. ASIC may not choose to bring the
action depending on its own assessment and resources. The company,
particularly in this case where the directors and shareholders are the same
would not bring the claim. Although in theory this could be overcome by a
derivative action the third party client is not in a position to seek leave to do
so.
89 Knights Capital [2016] WASC 69 (4 March 2016) [79]–[81].
90 Ibid [81].
91 (2016) 336 ALR 209.
92 Ibid 297 [457].
93 Ibid 299 [469], 301 [478].
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If ASIC could be successful in such a claim the client may recover for their
loss. But if the client can sue the company in tort and join the directors as
defendants to that tort the corporate veil can be lifted and direct access gained
to the directors’ resources. This is but one reason why this matter must be
resolved. Not only for the beneﬁt of the third party but to allow directors some
certainty in assessing their own risk in operating their corporate structures.
IV Conclusion: Suggesting a way forward to provide
certainty for directors’ own risk management
After consideration of all of the original tests, their applications and the
varying language that has come from later decisions, it is suggested that we
should simplify the steps in the judicial process as much as possible. It is
proposed that those deliberations should be as follows:
(1) The court must ﬁrst deal with the question of whether it could be
a case of the director being the primary tortfeasor (rare on the basis
of the analysis above) or whether the company has committed the tort
but there is evidence to suggest the director may be joined in the
action behind the company as a joint tortfeasor. The failure to make
this clear initially or to make presumptions in this regard only added
to the continuing confusion in the developments of the tests;
particularly the ‘make the tort his own test’ and the ‘assumption of
responsibility test’. As even their names suggest, the norm would be
liability for the company and it would take something special for a
director to be considered the primary tortfeasor. But what if the test
fails to ﬁnd a liability for the director in this way? The impression
given is an ‘all or nothing approach’.
(2) How should the law then do the work of resolving if the director
could still be a secondary joint tortfeasor behind the company? It is
proposed the resolution requires two stages. The ‘direct and procure
test’ should be the ﬁrst step. It should not be considered however, as
originally proposed to be, the only criteria to obtain a result. It cannot
survive as a stand-alone test, at least in its literal form. Something
more is needed. That is, a further degree of knowledge and
involvement in the tort.
The second step therefore is consideration of what could meet this
added requirement of knowledge of the unlawfulness of the act and
involvement in the tortious act of the company which is now so
plainly crucial. But the way in which the courts have considered
these questions needs to be brought together. Arguably the slightly
different language used and the circumstances of the particular cases
has been key in causing confusion. Where the company is the
primary tortfeasor, the question of knowledge, relationship with the
company’s acts and the director’s intentions should be recognised
within a scale of involvement that will raise liability as a joint
tortfeasor. The court could draw on all of the case examples above,
relevant to the particular circumstances of the case, to substantiate it.
At the lower end of this scale, knowledge that the company is
invading the rights of another (or perhaps even with reckless
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indifference) may be enough in the relevant case and at the other end
of the spectrum, deliberately using the company as the conduit
through which the tort can be committed will deﬁnitely create the
liability and will be seen as another example of the common law and
equity legitimately raising the corporate veil.
(3) In this way we can prevent ongoing disputes of the merits of
‘apparently’ different tests and concentrate on bringing them together
as examples of the one key question: Did the director direct or
procure the company to commit the tort with a degree of knowledge
and involvement recognised as causing liability within the scale
above? Where one ﬁts on that scale would obviously then be taken
into account in the court’s decision as to appropriate remedies.
Finally, the potential use of s 180(1) of the Corporations Act (should
ASIC or the company be of a mind to do so) as a means by which
public remedies might afford beneﬁts to third parties is possible.
However recognition of the rights of these third parties, in their own
name, to sue directors as primary or joint tortfeasors is still powerful
and real and must be added to the checklist directors should consider
when using the corporate structure as a means of protecting personal
assets.
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